我国上市公司控股股东利益侵占行为研究:一个委托代理模型  

Study of Violation Behavior of Controlling Shareholder of China's Listed Company:A Principle-Agent Model

作　　者：朱建平[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《区域金融研究》2011年第5期73-77,共5页Journal of Regional Financial Research

摘　　要：我国上市公司控股股东侵占上市公司以及中小股东利益的行为屡见不鲜。其主要途径包括:虚假招股说明书、关联交易、股利政策、定向增发以及利润操纵。上市公司中小股东与控股股东间存在着委托代理关系。控股股东的利益侵占行为不仅降低了上市公司的期望收益,还降低了控股股东自身的努力程度以及所享有的收益份额。通过推进上市公司股权分散化、完善上市公司信息披露制度、推进"以股抵债"等金融创新,可以纠正上市公司控股股东侵占中小股东利益行为。The violation of controlling shareholder of listed company to the interests of minority shareholders is common phenomenon.Main ways of the violation include false prospectus,related party transactions,dividend policy,private placement and profit manipulation.The principle-agent relationship exists between minority shareholders of listed company and the controlling shareholder.The violation behavior not only reduces the expected revenue of the listed company,but also reduces the shareholder＇s own effort and revenue share.By promoting decentralization of share of listed company,improving the information disclosure system and promoting the ＂debt-equity swaps＂ financial innovation,the violation behavior of controlling shareholder of listed company will be corrected.

关 键 词：控股股东 利益侵占 私有收益 委托代理 

分 类 号：F832.39[经济管理—金融学]