高管过度激励、所有权性质与企业国际化战略  

Excessive Top-management Incentives,Ownership Property and Corporate Internationalization Strategy

作　　者：左晶晶[1] 唐跃军[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [2]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2011年第6期79-89,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802015)

摘　　要：文章采用中国制造业上市公司的数据讨论高管薪酬激励和股权激励对企业国际化程度的影响。研究证实,由于边际递减效应在一定程度上形成所谓的过度激励,中国上市公司高管股权激励与企业国际化程度之间表现为倒"U"形关系;进一步研究发现,国有和民营上市公司薪酬激励和股权激励在促使企业高管开展国际化经营方面的作用迥然相异。Using the data of listed companies in manufacturing, the paper discusses the impacts of compensation incentive and equity incentive for top management on the degree of internationalization of a firm. It not only finds that, owing to excessive incentives caused by marginal diminishing effect, the relationship between equity incentive for top management and the degree of internationalization of a firm is featured by inverted U shape, but also shows that the impacts of compensation incentive and equity incentive for top management on the degree of internationalization of a firm in stateowned firms and private ones differ widely.

关 键 词：国际化战略 边际递减效应 过度激励 隐性激励 所有权性质 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]