上市公司股权激励机制与经营业绩研究  

STUDY ON THE INCENTIVE MECHANISM AND PERFORMANCE OF LISTED COMPANY

作　　者：武永胜[1] 王秀丽[1] 万换英 杨晨光 

机构地区：[1]内蒙古工业大学管理学院,010051 [2]中国古二冶钢结构公司,014010

出　　处：《内蒙古工业大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第1期75-80,共6页Journal of Inner Mongolia University of Technology：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：(07XJY013);内蒙古工业大学校基金(X200727)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：年薪制与股权激励是当前企业经营中两种主要的激励模式,虽然这两种模式的理论基础都是委托代理理论,但两者在内容上还是有很大的差别。本文在Holmstrom和Milgrom线性模型的基础上,引入股权获得成本和折现系数,从而建立了线性股权激励模型。从上市公司中抽取了181个样本,对公司业绩指标与效益薪酬比例、持股比例之间的关系进行了实证分析,结果发现年薪制与公司经营业绩显著正相关。Annual salary system and stock incentive are the main incentive mechanism recently,though the foundation of them is principal-agent theory,there are many difference.This paper brings stock-obtained cost and discount coefficient into H-M model,then built linear stock incentive model.At last,this paper draws 181 samples from all of Chinese list company,and analyzes the relationship between performance index and the proportion of performance salary,the relationship between performance index and shareholding ratio,it results that annual salary has significant positive correlation with performance.

关 键 词：委托代理 股权激励 折现系数 效益薪酬 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]