企业多元化战略实施的职业经理人激励研究——基于多任务委托代理理论  

Research on the Incentive System of Professional Managers in Diversified Strategy Implementation

作　　者：陈瑞琦[1] 邓颖懋[1] 吴英伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2011年第3期90-93,共4页Shanghai Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目"管理咨询业跨国公司对中国客户的垂直约束行为研究"(编号70902016)

摘　　要：本文运用Holmstrom-Milgrom的多任务委托代理理论,提出假设,并建立企业多元化战略实施的职业经理人激励模型。依据模型给出了信息对称和非对称条件下的多元化战略职业经理人激励措施。并对多元化战略实施的激励措施的设计提出了对策建议。In this paper, a hypothesis is proposed by Holmstrom- Milgrom＇s multi-task principal-agent theory, and the incentive model to professional managements is es- tablished for the implementation of the diversification strate- gy. And while gave strategy incentive measures to profes- sional managements on the basement of the model under the information given or not. Then, put forward some sugges- tions about the design of the implementation to the business diversification strategy.

关 键 词：相关多元化战略 多任务委托代理 激励对策 

分 类 号：C96[经济管理—人力资源管理]