从1931年大水看民国时期中央与地方救灾关系博弈  

The Game of Relief Relations between Central and Local Government in 1931 Flood

作　　者：孔祥成[1] 刘芳[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院思政部,上海201620 [2]上海工程技术大学社科学院,上海201620

出　　处：《中国农史》2011年第2期112-121,共10页Agricultural History of China

基　　金：上海市教育委员会2011年度科研创新项目<启示与借鉴:民国时期的灾后重建机制研究>(11YS244);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题<民国时期灾害应急救助机制研究--以1931年江淮大水为例>青年基金(2008ELS002);第45批中国博士后科学基金<民国时期灾后重建机制研究>(20090450645)

摘　　要：1931年大水救济,国家吸收了义赈精英,组成了国民政府救济水灾委员会(以下简称国水会),借鉴采用了义赈经验,在此基础上,对中央与地方在救灾中的关系重新定位。一方面在机制的设计中,重组一套自上而下的中央救灾军,将救灾指挥权和调度权收归中央,避免假手于地方。另一方面,国水会不得不借助于地方行政资源及其对地方赈务的熟悉,将地方政府对救灾工作的支持和配合作为考核其政绩的一个重要筹码。经过多轮利益博弈与关系整合,国水会以退为进,最终磨合出与地方政府谈判协商的合作机制。During the relief of 1931 flood,the central government absorbed the civil relief elite,and formed the Committee for Flood Relief of Nanjing Kuomingtang Government（abbreviation.CFRNKG）.The CFRNKG used folk relief experience for reference,and relocated the relations between central and local government from two aspects.First,the CFRNKG reorganized a central relief power team from top to bottom,thus the central government take back the relief power of commanding and regulating,avoiding being controlled by the local group.Second,the CFRNKG had to recourse to the local administration resources due to its familiarity with the local relation network.As a result,the CFRNKG found a new way to urge the local government to support and cooperate with the national relief team by taking the relief work as its political achievement.After several conflicts,the CFRNKG made concessions in order to gain advantages over the leadership,and finally found a frame in which all subjects could negotiate and cooperate well.

关 键 词：1931年大水 中央与地方 博弈与整合 国水会 

分 类 号：K235[历史地理—历史学]