奖惩机制对零售商负责回收闭环供应链的影响  

The Effects of Premium and Penalty Mechanism on Manufacturer Take-back Closed-loop Supply Chain

作　　者：聂佳佳[1] 王文宾[2] 吴庆[3] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116 [3]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2011年第2期52-59,共8页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目(71090402);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871125;70902019);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(10YJC630183);中央高校基本科研业务专项资助(SWJTU11BR059)

摘　　要：在奖惩机制下,研究了回收再制造闭环供应链的定价和回收决策,将奖惩机制下的最优定价和回收比例与无回收再制造和无奖惩机制两种情形下的最优定价和回收比例进行了比较。发现奖惩机制有利于零售商降低零售价格,提高回收比例;奖惩机制有利于制造商利润的提高;当奖惩力度较大时,奖惩机制下零售商最优利润高于无奖惩机制下的最优利润,而当奖惩力度较小时,奖惩机制下零售商最优利润低于无奖惩机制下的最优利润。The decisions of pricing and collecting in closed-loop supply chain are studied with the premium and penalty mechanism.The optimal pricing and collecting rate with the premium and penalty mechanism are compared with the optimal pricing and collecting rate without remanufacturing and without premium and penalty mechanism respectively.The results show that it is better for the retailer decreasing the retail price and increasing collecting rate with premium and penalty mechanism,the optimal profit of the manufacturer with premium and penalty mechanism is higher than that without remanufacturing and without premium and penalty mechanism.If the degree of premium and penalty is large,the optimal profit of the retailer with premium and penalty mechanism is higher than that without premium and penalty mechanism,and if the degree of premium and penalty is low,the optimal profit of the retailer with premium and penalty mechanism is lower than that without premium and penalty mechanism.

关 键 词：逆向物流 闭环供应链 再制造 奖惩机制 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]