专利保护下再制造闭环供应链协调机制研究  

Closed-loop supply chain coordination research with remanufacturing under patent protection

作　　者：熊中楷[1] 申成然[1] 彭志强[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆理工大学重庆知识产权学院,重庆400054

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2011年第6期76-85,共10页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871125);重庆市自然科学基金资助项目(2006BB0188);笹川良一优秀青年奖学基金(SYLFF)资助项目(BL0207)

摘　　要：受专利保护的原制造商享有产品再制造的专有权利,只有获得原制造商的专利许可,第三方再制造商才能进行专利产品的回收再制造.针对再制造知识产权保护在管理研究中的不足,本文建立了受专利保护的原制造商许可第三方再制造的闭环供应链模型,利用博弈理论讨论了分散与集中情况下节点企业的最优决策.同时,分析了专利许可对旧产品回收再制造的影响.在传统收益分享契约的基础上,将契约形式扩展到三方,提出了第三方回收再制造的收益分享与费用分担契约的协调机制.The original manufacturers have the exclusive right to remanufacture the patented products. The third party can only recycle and remanufacture the patented products with the patent licensing from the original manufacturer. There are the limited research studies about the remanufaeturing intellectual property protection. Thus, a closed-loop supply chain model was constructed which indicated the protected original manufacturer permit the third party to remanufacture. Game theory was used to discuss the optimal decision in the decentralized and centralized model. In addition, how patent licensing impact on the used products recycling and remanufacturing was analyzed. Finally, a revenue and expense sharing contract （RAESC） including three parties is proposed to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain different from the traditional revenue sharing contract.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 再制造 专利许可 收益分享.费用分担契约 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]