国有企业经营者报酬契约模型研究  

Research on the Compensation Contract Model for State-owned Enterprises′ Operator

作　　者：陈进[1] 张国民[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《商业研究》2011年第7期69-73,共5页Commercial Research

基　　金：教育部人文科学项目<基于期权角度的高管团队定价模型研究>;项目编号:07JA630070;上海市教委科研创新项目<基于期权视角的技术管理型人力资本定价模型研究>;项目编号:09YS231;上海市研究生创新基金项目<基于人力资本理论的国企高管激励的系统性全新研究>;项目编号:JWCXSL1022

摘　　要：随着现代企业制度在我国的建立和发展,作为现代公司治理的重要内容和公司长远发展的关键因素,激励约束机制引起了学界的广泛关注。与发达的市场经济下的企业组织相比,由于体制原因和历史遗留问题,国有企业激励约束机制的构建面临着多方面的特殊因素,存在诸多困难。本文主要分析了国有企业委托代理关系的特殊性和复杂性,通过建立国企经营者激励约束的报酬契约模型,为国企激励约束机制的改进提供一个新的思路和方法。Along with the establishment and development of the modern enterprise system in China,the incentive and restraint mechanism,as the important content of modern company′s governance and the key of corporation long-term development,has caused widespread concern in academic circles.Compared with the developed economic entity,in the state-owned corporation,the construction of the incentive and restraint mechanisms face various special factors due to institutional reasons and historical issues,and there are lots of difficult problems.This paper analyzes the specificity and complexity of state-owned enterprises′ principal-agent relationships,then,based on that,it develops the compensation contractual model for incentives and constraints of state-owned enterprises′ operator,providing a new approach to improvement of state-owned enterprise incentive and restraint mechanisms.

关 键 词：国企经营者 特殊契约关系 报酬契约模型 激励约束机制 长期激励 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]