金融契约、控制权配置与管理者投资决策  

Financial Contract,Allocation of Control Rights and Managerial's Investment Dicision

作　　者：徐细雄[1] 吕金晶[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2011年第8期19-26,共8页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年基金(09YJC630243)"可转债融资对内部公司治理和企业价值的影响及机理研究";教育部高等学校博士点新教师基金(20100191120041)"控制权配置;相机治理机制与企业价值:基于控制权动态转移视角";中央高校基本科研业务费重点项目(CDJSK 11 009)"我国企业高管腐败的制度诱因;产生机理及治理对策研究"

摘　　要：以金融契约和控制权配置理论为基础,构建了"金融契约—控制权配置—管理者投资决策"的理论分析框架,揭示了不同金融契约结构下企业控制权配置的属性特征及其对管理者投资决策的影响,并以2002～2005年中国上市公司数据进行了实证检验。结果表明,企业负债规模与过度投资之间存在非线性U型关系;同时,流通股比例增加则有利于抑制管理层过度投资,但第一大股东持股比例增加不仅不能抑制过度投资,反而会恶化过度投资。进一步研究发现,其他条件相同的情形下,地方国企的过度投资程度最高,央属国企的过度投资水平居中,而民营企业的过度投资水平最低。Through buliding the research framework about ＂financial contract - allocation of cash flow right and con- trol right - managerial investment decision＂, this paper analyzes the relationship between overinvestment and financial contract from the angel of control right, with some empirical studies using the samples from 2002 - 2005 in Chinese A stock market. The results show that, the relationship between overinvestment and debt ratio takes on U curve, and the in- crease of traded stock will significantly decrease overinvestment, but the increase of shares by dominant shareholder will aggravate overinvestment. We also find that, among the three kinds of enterprise, the level of overinvestment is the highest in local SOEs but is the lowest in private firms, and the level of overinvestment in central SOEs is in the middle.

关 键 词：金融契约 控制权配置 投资决策 过度投资 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]