交叉上市、绑定假说与大股东利益侵占——基于关联交易视角的实证研究  

Cross-listing,Bonding Hypothesis and Interest-Expropriation of Large Shareholders Based on the Perspective of Related Party Transactions

作　　者：计方[1] 刘星[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2011年第4期105-114,128,共10页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100);教育部人文社科资助项目(07JC630009)

摘　　要：本文以在内地与香港两地交叉上市的公司为样本,从关联交易的视角考察了交叉上市是否有助于公司治理的改善。研究结果表明:交叉上市公司相较于非交叉上市公司有着更低的非公允关联交易水平,且其自身在交叉上市后也经历了显著的公司治理的改善,香港更为严格的法律制度与信息披露环境是造成这一差异的主要原因。实证研究结果不仅支持了绑定假说、丰富了交叉上市介入公司治理路径的研究,还从法与金融的角度提供了非公允关联交易水平如何受投资者保护环境差异影响的新证据。This paper investigates whether cross-listing is beneficial to corporate governance with sample from the companies cross-listed in the Mainland and Hong Kong.The results show that cross-listed companies have a lower level of non-fair related transactions compared to non-cross-listed companies and they experienced significant improvements in corporate governance after the cross-listing.The more stringent legal system and information disclosure environment of Hong Kong contribute to this difference.The empirical results not only support the bonding hypothesis but also provide new evidence from the perspective of 'law and finance' that the investor-protected environment has important impact on the non-fair related transactions.

关 键 词：交叉上市 绑定假说 利益侵占 关联交易 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]