证券市场监管理论——公共利益论、部门利益论的比较与评述  

A Study on Security Market Regulation Theory:Analysis of Public Benefit Theory and Sectional Interests Theory

作　　者：郝旭光[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029

出　　处：《国际商务（对外经济贸易大学学报）》2011年第4期46-54,共9页INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

基　　金：2005年国家社科基金课题<中国资本市场监管有效性研究>(BJL028)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：对经典的监管理论,尤其是对公共利益论、部门利益论与捕获论形成的背景、内涵、优缺点、适用条件进行了完整的比较分析,认为这些理论观点对监管的研究和监管实践有着重要的指导意义,但每一种理论都是对监管的某一方面进行的研究,还没有一种理论能够对证券市场监管的所有问题做出满意的解释。要提高我国证券市场监管的效果,需要从整体上运用这些理论,吸取其中的有益部分。This paper presents a complete analysis of the supervision of the classical theory, especially the formation of the background, connotation, advantages, disadvantages, applicable conditions for the public interest theory, sectional interests and capture theory. The paper believes that these theories have important guiding significance for regulatory research and supervision research, but each theory only studies a certain aspect of supervision, until now there is no theory to be able to explain the regulation of the securities markets, and to give a satisfactory answer to all the questions. To improve the effect of the Chinese securities market supervision, we need to draw of the good part of the theory, and to use the theory on the whole.

关 键 词：市场失灵 证券市场监管 公共利益论 部门利益论 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]