我国国有企业过度投资——基于生产要素投入视角的理论解释  

Over-Investment of the State Owned Enterprises in China:A Theoretical Explanation from the Perspective of production Factors Input

作　　者：黎精明[1] 唐霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430081

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2011年第4期46-50,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：湖北省社会科学研究基金资助项目([2010]099);武汉科技大学绿色制造与节能减排科技研究中心开放基金重点项目(A1002);教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(08JC630061)

摘　　要：已有理论尚不能很好地解释我国国有企业的过度投资现象。基于生产要素投入视角的研究表明:由于国有企业承担了办社会的成本,因此政府必须对其进行补贴,其方式是政府无偿或低成本地给其进行资源划拨或转让,从而导致其低资本成本,这必然增强国有企业以资本替代劳动的激励,进而导致国有企业过度投资和社会福利损失。因此,抑制国有企业过度投资的基本路径在于:彻底剥离国有企业承担的办社会的成本→取消政府对国有企业的政策性补贴→恢复资本要素市场的价格形成与作用机制。The over investment phenomena state owned enterprises （SOEs） in China haven＇t a good explaination now. The study from the perspective of production factors inputs has shown that the social responsibility costs borne by SOEs are relatively high, so government give them some subsidy. However, the subsidies are given by the way that valuable resources are transfered to SOEs in no cost or law cost. The low cost in captial input give SOEs the incentives to substitute capital for labor, which lead to the over investment and loss of social welfare. So the solu- tions are. rationalization the social cost of SOEs→ cancellation the political subsidies to SOEs → resumption the value curve effects in capital market.

关 键 词：国有企业 过度投资 资本要素 非效率经营 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]