国企分红、国企绩效与过度投资:实证检验——基于国有资本金预算新政前后的对比分析  

Payout Rate of SOEs,Performance of SOEs and Over Investment:Empirical Test

作　　者：张建华[1] 王君彩[2] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学应用经济学博士后流动站,北京100081 [2]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2011年第8期66-69,共4页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：2007年12月11日我国颁布《中央企业国有资本收益收取管理暂行办法》,规定相关中央企业按照约定比例上缴红利。从而结束了我国国有企业十多年不分红的历史。该办法实施三年多来的效果究竟如何?本文以办法实施前后我国国有控股上市的相关数据为样本,实证检验了国企分红、国企绩效以及过度投资的关系,通过对比分析检验了该办法的实施效果。为完善我国国有企业的分红政策提出了实证证据。The management rule of state owned capital profit for central enterprises was enacted in December 2007. It stipulates that relevant central enterprises have to hand in profit according to certain ratio, which ends the history which Chinese state owned enterprises do not give bonus. What does it happen after throe years of taking effect the rule？ In this paper, based on relevant data of state owned listed companies before and after carrying out the rule, the relationship among profit-sharing, performance of state owned enterprises and overinvestment has been examined by empirical evidence. The effect of the rule is checked by comparison and analysis, which address the empirical evidence for perfecting policy of payout policy of Chinese state owned enterprises.

关 键 词：国企分红 国企绩效 过度投资 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]