考虑溢出效应的互补品企业合作广告协调  

A Study on the Coordination in Cooperative Advertising between the Enterprises producing Complementary Goods with Spillover Effect

作　　者：田丽娜[1] 但斌[1] 董绍辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400004 [2]河北科技大学经济管理学院,石家庄050018

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2011年第4期448-455,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972056)

摘　　要：针对互补品需求的相互关联性造成互补品企业广告促销存在溢出效应的现象,构建了基于广告分担率的互补品企业合作广告博弈模型,对比研究了斯坦克尔伯格博弈和纳什合作博弈下互补品企业双方的最优广告决策和收益,论证了纳什合作博弈均衡具有帕累托优势,并利用鲁宾斯坦恩——斯塔尔讨价还价模型对增加的收益进行了分配,得到了一种帕累托最优合作方案,实现了互补品销售系统的协调。最后,通过数值算例说明了有关命题的有效性。Aimed at the spillover effect in advertising and sales promotion between enterprises producing complementary goods,a cooperative advertising game model based on participate rate between the complementary goods enterprises is developed.The optimal strategies and profits of the complementary goods enterprises under Stackelberg game and Nash cooperative game are compared,and those under Nash cooperative are proved having Pareto advantage.Further,the surplus of advertising cooperation is shared by using Rubinstein bargaining model,and a Pareto cooperative scheme which can coordinae marketing systems is obtained.A numerical example is given to demonstrate the validity of the conclusions.

关 键 词：互补品 溢出效应 合作广告 讨价还价 

分 类 号：F713.50[经济管理—市场营销] F713.8[经济管理—产业经济]