高校教师教学质量评议机制的委托-代理模型分析  

Principal-Agent Model of the Teaching Quality Evaluation Mechanism for College Teacher

作　　者：刘德海[1] 王维国[2,1] 宋雯彦[2,1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2011年第15期58-65,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(70901016);全国教育科学规划2010年度专项研究课题(GLA102084);辽宁省教育科学"十一五"规划2010年度课题(JG10DB053);东北财经大学教学改革课题(YY10019)

摘　　要：高校教学评议体制是高等教育质量保障体系的重要组成部分,但是实践中仍存在一些问题:过分强调科学管理主义而忽视了教师的精神激励;可能出现学生评价不准确和不负责任,学生与教师之间形成合谋等现象导致监督和考评作用失效;教学质量评价指标的科学化、教学评议的反馈途径等.通过建立高校教学质量评议的委托代理模型,同时考虑到高校教师的工资待遇等物质激励,以及职业道德和自我价值实现等精神激励两种因素,剖析了无私奉献和机会主义两种教学行为的混同均衡和分离均衡条件;最后,提出改进和完善高校教学质量评估的建议.University teaching quality evaluation mechanism is the important component for higher education quality safeguard system, but practically there still has some problems. For example, so overemphasized the scientific management principle as to neglect teacher＇s spiritual drive; there possibly become invalid for the supervision and evaluation functions of teaching quality evaluation system because of the inaccurate and irresponsible student assessment, and the collusion behaviors between the student and the teacher; designing the scientific teaching quality evaluating indicator system, and building teaching evaluation feedback mechanism; and so on. The paper establishes the principal-agent model of university teaching quality evaluation, where the material encouraging, for example, wage and treatment, and spirit encouraging that are the occupational ethics and the self-value realization are simultaneously considered, and then analyzes the pooling equilibrium and separate equilibrium conditions for two kinds of teaching behaviors which are selfless contribution and opportunism. Finally, the paper proposes the suggestion to improve and consummate the university teaching quality evaluation mechanism.

关 键 词：教学质量评议 委托代理理论 高等教育质量工程 混同均衡 分离均衡 

分 类 号：G642.4[文化科学—高等教育学]