金字塔结构、法律环境与超控制权收益——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Ownership Structure,Legal Protection and the Excessive Benefits of Control——Evidence from Listed Companies in China

作　　者：刘立燕[1] 熊胜绪[2] 

机构地区：[1]江汉大学商学院,湖北武汉430056 [2]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,湖北武汉430064

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2011年第8期30-35,共6页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年项目"控股股东超控制权收益的成因与规制研究:以中国上市公司为例"的阶段性成果(10YJC790170)

摘　　要：对我国2005-2007年间发生控制权转让上市公司的实证研究显示,我国上市公司最终控制人的控制层级与获取的超控制权收益正相关,法律保护水平与超控制权收益负相关。研究表明最终控制人的控制链条越长,其获取的超控制权收益水平越高,而较好的法律保护水平能够抑制其超控制权收益的水平。由此带来的启示是:应采取政策措施推进控股股东缩短控制链条,发展核心能力,既能有效降低控股股东的超控制权收益,也有利于促进其获取合理收益;同时应进一步落实对中小股东的法律保护,改善执法效率。研究还显示对最终控制人较高的股权制衡水平能够显著降低其获取的超控制权收益。Excessive benefits of control imply that protecting minority shareholders does not conflict with the controlling shareholders＇ reasonable benefits.But how can the controlling shareholders＇ excessive benefits of control be reduced without hurting their reasonable benefits？ The paper examines the control transactions during 2005 and 2007 in Chinese stock markets,and finds that the number of pyramidal levels of the ultimate controlling shareholders is positively related with their excessive benefits of control,while the legal protection is negatively related with the excessive benefits of control.The enlightenment to us is that shortening control chain and simplifying the control structure can curb the extraction of ultimate controllers,which is in alignment with the refocusing strategy and helpful to stimulate their reasonable benefits.And better legal protection is important.We also find that the presence of other block shareholders can reduce the excessive benefits of control.

关 键 词：控制权收益 超控制权收益 控制层级 最终控制人 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]