对“失败”研发项目实行实物期权激励的思考  

The real options incentive to "failed" R&D projects

作　　者：高峻峰[1,2] 银路[1] 蒋兰[2] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054 [2]西南财经大学天府学院,四川成都610074

出　　处：《科研管理》2011年第8期127-132,共6页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目:“新兴技术‘三要素多层次共生演化’机制研究”(70772069),2008-2010

摘　　要：如何对"失败"项目进行激励是一个难题。本文论述了基于实物期权价值对"失败"研发项目实现有效激励的一种思路。这种方法把企业在"失败"项目中积累的资源与能力看作是后续技术项目期权价值的构成部分,对应的实物期权类型分别为:延迟期权、收缩期权、放弃期权、转换期权、扩张期权和分期增长期权(产品的升级换代)。企业可以根据不同实物期权的价值设计激励方案,并选择相应的行权方式。How to give incentive to the ＂failed＂ projects is a difficult issue. A method of real options incentive to R＆D teams which is s,suitable for ＂failed＂ B＆D projects is discussed. ＂Ibls approach looks at the enterprises resources and capabilities accumulations in the ＂failed＂ project as option value components of follow-up technical projects. These options include the option to defer, the option to contract, the option to change scale, the option to abandon, the option to switch, and the option to growth （the upgrade of products）. The firms could choose appropriate option incentive schemes and exercise methods by the value of different real optiona.

关 键 词：实物期权 激励 “失败”研发项目 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]