制度弹性与控股股东利益侵占行为  

Institutional Flexibility and Expropriation of Controlling Shareholders

作　　者：肖成民[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院会计与财务学院,上海201620

出　　处：《上海立信会计学院学报》2011年第4期26-33,共8页Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70902063);教育部人文社会科学项目(09YJC630157);上海市教委重点学科建设项目(J51701);上海市教委科研创新项目(10YS198);上海市"晨光计划"(09CG66)

摘　　要：以往文献主要关注制度质量这一制度环境特征对公司会计与财务行为的影响。文章将制度弹性概念引入会计与财务分析,在对制度弹性进行一般性描述和来源分析的基础上,以控股股东利益侵占行为为例,阐释了制度弹性对公司行为的影响,并指出了建立和维持政治关系是控股股东寻求和利用制度弹性的重要方式之一。制度弹性概念的引入将有助于会计与财务研究更全面地解读制度环境对公司行为的影响,以及公司行为与制度环境之间的互动关系。Prior research mostly focuses on the effect of institutional quality on corporate accounting and financial behavior. In this paper, institutional flexibility is introduced into analysis of accounting and financial research. Based on general description and original analysis on institutional flexibility, we examine how institutional flexibility affects company behavior through expropriation of controlling shareholders. Establishing and maintaining political connection is one of the important ways that the controlling shareholders could seek and utilize institutional flexibility. Institutional flexibility is an important concept to better understand the effect of institutional environment on company behavior and the inter-relationships between company behavior and institutional environment.

关 键 词：制度质量 制度弹性 控股股东 利益侵占 政治关系 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]