利益侵占约束:一个基于债务结构的改进模型  

Restrictions on Benefit Expropriation:An Improved Model Based on Debt Structures

作　　者：王艳辉[1] 庄燕清[1] 吕青军[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110819

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第8期1206-1209,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：辽宁省财政科研基金资助项目(2007B002)

摘　　要：不同的债务结构具有不同的公司治理效应,也对控股股东的利益侵占有不同的约束作用;为此,提出了一个改进的LLSV模型,即在控股股东利益侵占基本分析模型(LLSV模型)的基础上引入债务因素,分析债务结构对利益侵占的影响.选择我国844家上市公司作为样本,对模型分析结论进行了实证检验,得出结论:债务期限结构中的长期债务、债务优先权结构中的非优先级债务、债务布置结构中的公开债务对控股股东利益侵占具有更强的约束作用.Different debt structures have different effects on the corporate governance and different restrictions on the benefit expropriation of controlling shareholders as well.Therefore,a modified LLSV model is proposed by introducing debt structure factors to the benefit expropriation analysis theory of controlling shareholders.Using the related data of 844 Chinese listed companies,the model was tested and verified.It is found that the long-term debt of the debt maturity structure,the non-priority debt of the debt priority structure and the public debt of the debt layout structure have obviously strong restrictions on the benefit expropriation of controlling shareholders.

关 键 词：控股股东 利益侵占 债务结构 外部投资者保护 LLSV模型 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]