政治联系、过度投资与公司价值——基于国有上市公司的经验证据  

Political Connections,Over-investment and Corporate Value:Empirical Evidence from State-owned Public Listed Companies

作　　者：杜兴强[1] 曾泉[1] 杜颖洁[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《金融研究》2011年第8期93-110,共18页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71072053);福建省社会科学重点项目(2010A012);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2010221021)的资助

摘　　要：政治联系是中国资本市场国有上市公司中广泛存在的现象。本文手工搜集了国有上市公司2004～2008年期间关键高管的政治联系数据,采纳多维的政治联系度量方法,实证研究了关键高管的政治联系对国有上市公司的过度投资行为和公司价值的影响。本文研究结果表明,政治联系显著增加了国有上市公司过度投资的概率,且政治联系的强度越大、过度投资的概率越大;相对于中央政治联系,地方政治联系显著的增加了国有上市公司过度投资的概率。进一步,过度投资行为显著降低了国有上市公司的公司价值。Political connection of state-owned public listed companies is universal phenomenon in the Chinese capital market. The paper manually collects the political connections data of key managers in the state-owned public listed companies, and adopts comprehensively various measurement methods about political connections to test the relation between political connections, over-investment and corporate value. The results show that po- litical connections significantly increase the probability of over-investment of the state-owned public listed com- panies, and there is a significantly positive relation between the strength of political connections and the proba- bility of over-investment. Furthermore, local political connections significantly increase the probability of over- investment of stateowned public listed companies than central political connections. The paper also discovers that over-investment behavior of state-owned public listed companies significantly decreases corporate value.

关 键 词：政治联系 过度投资 公司价值 TOBIN’Q 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]