基于批发价格契约的质量成本审查模型分析  

Analysis of quality cost audit model based on wholesale price contract

作　　者：张煜[1] 汪寿阳[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100191 [2]中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院,北京100190

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2011年第8期1481-1488,共8页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70731003)

摘　　要：研究了供应链中上下游企业间关于质量成本信息的不对称现象,并由此可能产生的谎报问题.建立了以批发价格契约为基础,同时引入第三方质量成本审查策略的契约机制.结果表明:新的契约形式不但可以消除不对称信息的影响,而且通过审查策略对谎报质量成本信息现象进行了有效的抑制.下游企业可以通过合理的提高批发价格,激励上游企业增加质量成本投入,得到相应较高质量水平的产品,对生产有正向激励作用.最后通过算例验证了相关结论.In this paper,the asymmetric information between enterprises in supply chain and the resulting effect of cheating on quality cost are studied.Based on wholesale price contract a stylized contract menu is presented using third party quality cost audit strategy to establish an effective incentive mechanism.The conclusions demonstrate that the new contract can not only eliminate the effect of asymmetric quality cost information but also restrain the upstream enterprise from cheating on the quality cost.The downstream enterprise can improve quality level by raising wholesale price reasonably to incent the upstream enterprise to invest more on quality cost in the new contract.A numerical study is given to demonstrate the conclusions of the paper.

关 键 词：供应链 批发价格契约 质量成本 审查 不对称信息 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]