基于相对业绩比较的企业激励机制设计  

The Design of the Incentive Mechanisms for Circular Economy Based on Relative Performance Evaluation

作　　者：王杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]贺州学院数学系,广西贺州542800

出　　处：《贺州学院学报》2011年第3期119-123,共5页Journal of Hezhou University

摘　　要：循环经济是一种符合可持续要求的经济发展模式,政府可以利用激励机制当中潜在的经济效益引导企业主动从事循环经济生产活动。文章通过将相对业绩比较引入到政府———企业二元主体的单因素委托—代理模型中以设计循环经济激励机制。结果表明,通过有效的绩效评价制度和必要的监督、披露机制,结合灵活的手段,政府既可以提高对企业真实生产努力的激励强度,降低企业所面临的不确定性,又能够降低信息不对称造成的代理成本,节约政府支出。As one kind of economic development pattern, Circular Economy, which be found in the long - term practice exploration and the fundamental research, conforms to the requirement of sustainable development. The government could induce the enterprises, concerning with their own benefit, to practice the circular economic production when the incentive mechanisarm with the latent economic benefit are taken. By introducing the relative performance evaluation to the single factor model of principal - agent between the government and enterprises, this article designs the incentive mechanisms for circular economy to promote the economic efficiency. It is concluded that , by adopting the effective institution of performance evaluation, surveillance and disclosure nimble and practically, the government can enhance the incentive strongth corresponding with real production excitation of the enterprises, lessen the uncertainty enterprises faced when they practice the circular economic production, and reduce the agent cost effectively, resulting with the saving for the government expenditure.

关 键 词：循环经济 委托代理 相对业绩比较 激励机制 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]