不对称企业R&D投资博弈的完美贝叶斯均衡分析  

Analysis on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of Investment Game for R&D Activity between two Asymmetry Firms

作　　者：徐铁铮[1] 刘人境[2] 石翔[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国工程物理研究院,四川绵阳621900 [2]西安交通大学,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2011年第18期166-168,183,共4页Science and Technology Management Research

摘　　要：建立不对称企业在R&D投资决策中的博弈模型,通过模型分析得到,如果从税收和财政上向进行R&D投资多的企业提供更多的优惠政策,提高原创性知识转移的成本,建立知识的生产、价值评估、交易与投资的完整产业链条的情况下,大型知识企业具有R&D投资的根本动力,小企业具有在R&D上进行合作创新的动机。A game model on R＆D investment decision -making between two asymmetry firms is established in this paper. It is shown from the model that by providing more tax and financial preferential policies to the firm with more R＆D investment, large firms may have investment motive, while small ones may have the cooperative innovation motive in R＆D investment activity with the increasing the transfer cost of original knowledge, and establishing a complete industrial chain of knowledge producing, valuation, trading and investment.

关 键 词：不对称企业 分析 模型 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]