创业投资联盟的控制机制研究  

A Study on Control Mechanisms in Venture Capital Alliances

作　　者：梅德强[1,2] 龙勇[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工业职业技术学院,重庆401120 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2011年第9期85-94,共10页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"竞争性战略联盟的合作效应与效率边界研究"(70672012);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目"高新技术企业融资策略对企业战略模式和技术能力的影响研究"(NCET070906)

摘　　要：创业投资联盟中企业家通过出让股权获得投资家的融资,投资家提供非资本增值服务。如何获得足够资本和服务以实现联盟目标,同时又能防范企业的核心技术泄露是一个重要的问题。基于企业家角度,企业家选择有效的风险控制机制能够使资源获取和知识泄露二者保持平衡。将创业投资联盟的风险分为关系风险和绩效风险,将联盟的控制方式分为联盟范围选择和股权控制,来验证假设的合理性。结论表明,控制联盟风险对创业投资联盟的治理具有重要意义。Entrepreneurs share equity with venture capitalists aim to gain capital and non-financial value-added services in venture capital alliances.How to maintain sufficiently capital and services from investors to achieve alliance objectives is an important problem while controlling knowledge flows to avoid leakage of valuable technology.Based on the perspective of entrepreneurs,choosing appropriate control mechanisms to reduce alliance risks can keep a balance between services and leakage in venture capital alliances.In this paper the risks are considered separately as relational risk and performance risk and the governance mechanisms are sorted by equity control and scope control.The relationship between alliance risks and control mechanisms are demonstrated as being significant in venture capital alliances.

关 键 词：创业投资联盟 非资本增值服务 联盟风险 控制机制 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]