继任博弈及其在企业中的应用  

Succession Game and Its Application in Enterprise

作　　者：梁松[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学经济学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《经济经纬》2011年第5期75-80,共6页Economic Survey

摘　　要：继任博弈是一个新概念,它关注的是在任者如何决定留下多少贡献给继任者。企业中的继任博弈存在留下贡献(产出)占个人总贡献的比例为常数的均衡策略,但其通常和总产出最大化的条件有差异。这可以为个人努力的差异性、短视行为、企业中的利他行动提供不足提供新的解释。当参与人只存在一期,不同类型的参与人留下产出的量不同,并可能存在贝叶斯均衡策略。在家族企业继任博弈中,参与人的效用函数因亲缘关系而改变并使参与人对继任者能力要求降低,导致低能力的继任人缺乏提高生产能力的动力。Succession game is a new concept and it pays close attention to how the incumbent decides to leave some contribution to his successor.There is an equilibrium strategy that the ratio of the left contribution to the total personal contribution is a constant in the succession games of enterprises,but it is different to the condition of maximizing the total output,which provides new explanations to the difference in personal effort,shortsightedness,and lack of altruism.When the participant exists only one term,different participants will leave different amount of output,and the Bayesian equilibrium strategy may exist.In family business succession games,the utility function of participants will change with the genetic relationship and leads the participants to lower the request for the ability of successors.It will cause incompetent successors lacking the motivation for improving productivity.

关 键 词：继任 均衡策略 产出 

分 类 号：F406.15[经济管理—产业经济]