不确定交货条件下两供应商-单制造商协同供货模型  

A Coordination Model of Two-Suppliers and One-Manufacturer under Uncertain Delivery

作　　者：李果[1] 马士华[2] 高韬[3] 王兆华[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074 [3]河北省电子信息产品监督检验院,河北石家庄050071

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2011年第3期91-99,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072035;70972005);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-10-0048);霍英东青年教师基金(121079);北京市自然科学基金资助项目(9112013)

摘　　要：研究了不确定交货条件下两供应商-单制造商系统基于惩罚策略的协同供货模型。首先建立了基于惩罚策略的供应商和制造商模型,接着对模型中供应商和制造商的最优决策进行了分析,得出两供应商的最优生产批量决策存在唯一纳什均衡,且最优期望利润间接地受其单位缺货成本的影响,而制造商最优订货批量大于等于市场需求。其次建立了集中决策下供应链利润函数模型,并证明了该函数是决策变量的联合凹函数,存在唯一的最优解。为了达到集中决策下的供应链利润最大化,推导出基于惩罚策略的供应链协同机制。制造商通过调整订货批量和零件单位缺货惩罚成本,在供应链利润最大化前提下获得最大的剩余利润。最后数例分析说明制造商如何通过控制该惩罚成本系数使得供应链协同并获得最大的剩余利润。Uncertainties in supply,manufacturing or customer demand can disrupt supply chain operations.However,supply chain disruption caused by manufacturing and demand uncertainties have not been extensively studied in the current literature.The increase of social and natural disasters,such as 9/11 terrorist attack in the USA and earthquake in Japan,are raising the importance of studying supply chain uncertainty and disruption. This study focuses on random yields as an important aspect of supply uncertainty.In the multi-suppliers and one-manufacturer system with random yields and JIT delivery,each supplier will optimize its production quantity according to manufacturer＇s order quantity.The quantity delivered by different suppliers may be mismatched due to random yields.Delivery quantity of suppliers can lead to mismatching of component quantity in an assembly system.As a result of the mismatching issue,overstock and out-of-stock problems in stores can occur frequently.Therefore,it is essential to design an effective strategy to streamline the operation of multi-suppliers and one-manufacturer system. We construct a mathematical model for the two-supplier and one-manufacturer coordination based on penalty policy under delivery uncertainty.The model is to address the following questions：（1） How will residual value influence the decision of a manufacturer if order quantity is larger than delivery quantity？（2） How will inventory costs influence the decision of manufacturer and supplier due to uncertain delivery quantity of suppliers？ and（3） How to use penalty cost to influence the supply chain coordination？ The model is constructed based on the assumptions of risk neutral,information symmetry,fully rational decision makers,assembly of proportional parts,and JIT delivery. Our findings show that the expected profit function of suppliers is the concave function of production quantity.There is only one best production quantity to maximize the expected profit of suppliers.Given the order quantity of a manufac

关 键 词：不确定交货 惩罚成本 纳什均衡 供应链协同 集中决策 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]