外生的隐性“关系”与显性激励  

Implicit "Guanxi" and Explicit Incentive

作　　者：倪得兵[1] 戴春爱[1] 唐小我[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2011年第3期139-147,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70702025);电子科技大学中青年学术带头人培养计划

摘　　要：将关系理解为一种外生于显性激励问题的隐性合同,建立一个将显性激励问题"嵌入"关系维持过程的三阶段模型,获得了模型的均衡。通过分析该均衡,获得了如下结果:(1)关系双方的关系行为对关系利益系数、关系利益分享系数和委托人关系行为成本变化的反应具有协调性,但关系双方的关系行为对代理人关系行为成本的反应不协调;(2)关系利益系数增加(关系利益分享系数增加,委托人的关系行为成本减小)将倾向于降低显性业绩分享系数和期望显性业绩,而代理人的关系成本增加不会影响显性业绩分享系数,但会增加代理人用于生产显性业绩的努力,从而增加期望显性业绩;(3)与不考虑关系的委托代理模型合同相比较,考虑关系合同时的委托代理合同的激励效果是否优于前者取决于显性业绩生产所涉及到的经济特征、关系合同性质和关系行为成本。中国转型经济背景下,这些结果既可以用来解释一些典型经济现象,也可以在一定程度上回应"关系是否是引致竞争优势的一种资源"这一争论。Guanxi is an exogenous and implicit contract that allocates implicit benefits among parties in the same Guanxi network.The magnitude of implicit Guanxi benefits depends on the effort of parties to maintain their Guanxi.This paper constructs a three-stage model based on the principal-agent framework.The framework asserts that explicit incentive problems are embedded in the process of maintaining Guanxi through exogenous Guanxi contract and implicit benefit. In the three-stage model,we assume that principle and agent are selfish and their ultimate goal is to maximize their own benefits,including implicit Guanxi benefit and explicit economic benefit.The model has the sequential-moving property.Therefore,we employ the concept of sub-game perfect equilibrium.Our analysis results have three major findings.First,parties in the same Guanxi network harmoniously respond to changes in the coefficient of Gguanxi benefits,the sharing coefficient of Gguanxi benefits,and the cost of the principal＇s Guanxi actions.Second,an increase in the coefficient of Gguanxi benefits tends to increase the sharing coefficient of explicit performance and expected explicit performance.The cost of an agent＇s Guanxi actions increases performance by stimulating the agent to elicit more efforts in producing explicit performance.Third,explicit incentive contracts that address concerns of implicit Guanxi contract have better performance than explicit incentive contracts without. These findings are applicable to explaining unique economic phenomena of Chinese economy and understanding Quanxi as a resource for competitive advantages.The findings of this study help us understand the relationship between implicit Guanxi contact and explicit incentive mechanisms.Research results also enable us to drawn managerial implications,such as the impact of an implicit Quanxi on explicit incentives and economic performance,and unexpected consequences resulted from the ignorance of Guanxi for practitioners in Guanxi-prevailing situations.

关 键 词：关系 合同 关系合同 激励 业绩 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] D91[政治法律—法学]