检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
机构地区:[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]长江师范学院经济与工商管理学院,涪陵408100
出 处:《管理工程学报》2011年第3期172-177,共6页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472016)
摘 要:在供应商技术创新条件下,以供应商单独投资和制造商-供应商联合投资为研究对象,分别建立企业间决策的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了技术不确定性对企业决策的影响,比较了两种情形下双方的投资决策制定策略。研究结果表明:随着创新技术可行性的增加,供应商会提升投资的水平,制造商会降低投资的分担比例;联合投资不仅提高了供应商技术创新投资水平,同时也扩展了供应商创新技术的可行性区间。Technology innovations made by one business partner can have influence on other partners in a supply chain.For instance,production innovation can decrease product price and manufacturing cost.However,suppliers are more concerned with their own profit rather than manufacturers'.As a result,the entire supply chain innovation can be jeopardized.It is necessary for supplier and manufacturer to jointly make innovation investment and receive benefits from it. The assumption of Stackelberg game model is that only suppliers will invest in innovation themselves.The model is useful only when technology innovations have high feasibility and low uncertainty.We decide to improve the traditional assumption of Stackelberg game model.We assume that supplier and manufacturer jointly invest in technology innovation,and their goal is to make profits for the entire supply chain.Based on the new assumption,Stackelberg game model shows that suppliers will increase investment in technology innovation and manufacturers will reduce investment share proportion.Another finding is that joint investment of supplier and manufacturer in innovations will encourage supplier to play a more active role in technology innovation. Our findings have two important implications.First,a supplier will be motivated to increase investment on technology innovation when its manufacturers share innovation investment.Second,the increase of technology feasibility can encourage suppliers to make investment in technologies with higher uncertainty.
关 键 词:技术创新 供应链 联合投资 技术不确定 STACKELBERG博弈
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.222