控制权配置、代理冲突与审计供求——来自中国家族上市公司的经验证据  

Control Rights Allocation,Agency Conflicts and Auditor Demand and Supply——Empirical evidence form the Chinese family listed companies

作　　者：陈德球[1] 叶陈刚[1] 李楠[2] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际财务与会计研究中心,邮政编码100029 [2]中国银行总行海外机构管理部

出　　处：《审计研究》2011年第5期57-64,共8页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家社科基金(10BGL017);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71102076);教育部人文社科青年项目(10YJC630019);对外经济贸易大学转轨时期公司治理创新团队和211工程项目(7320032)等资助

摘　　要：本文分别从控制权与现金流权分离度、家族董事席位超额控制和家族CEO等三个维度分解家族控制权配置模式,考察控制权配置对审计师需求和供给效应的影响。研究发现,在审计师的供给方面,超额审计费用随着代理冲突的提高而增强,与两权分离度、家族董事席位超额控制程正相关,与家族CEO负相关。在审计师的需求方面,"四大"审计师需求与两权分离度和家族CEO负相关,与家族董事席位超额控制程度正相关。研究结论表明,在不同的代理冲突下,审计师需求和供给效应的差异性特征反映了家族企业控制人在发送可承诺信号和攫取公司资源之间的利益权衡选择。Theallocation of control rights affects the agency conflicts and govemance effect of family finn. This paper decompose the control mechanism from the wedge between control rights and cash flow rights, the excess board seats control and family CEO, investigate the effect of the control rights allocations on auditor demand and auditor supply. We found that auditors supply is positive with the agency conflict, and abnormal audit fees increase as the separation of ownership, family excess board seats control and family CEO the ＂big four＂ auditor needs is negative with the separation of ownership and family CEO, but positive with family excess board seats control. Conclusion shows that the conflict in different agents, the demand and supply effects of auditor characteristics reflect the trade off between the effect of family business can be committed in sending signals and negative effect of the ultimate controllers expropriate resources.

关 键 词：控制权配置 代理冲突 审计供给 审计需求 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F239.4[经济管理—国民经济] F224