股权分置改革能抑制控股股东过度投资行为吗?  

Can Split-share Reform Restrain the Overinvestment Behavior of Controlling Shareholders?

作　　者：黄晶[1] 陈工孟[1] 包文卿[1] 陈峥嵘[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052 [2]海通证券股份有限公司研究所,上海200001

出　　处：《财经研究》2011年第10期26-36,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70872073)

摘　　要：文章基于上市公司投资行为的视角研究了控股股东侵占与公司治理问题,特别考察了股权分置改革是否有助于缓解控股股东过度投资。基于Richardson(2006)预期投资模型,文章的研究结果显示控制权与现金流权分离度对过度投资有显著的正向影响,而股权分置改革能够显著弱化这种分离度与过度投资之间的正向关系。政府控股公司比私人控股公司的过度投资更为严重,而改善外部治理环境在一定程度上可以抑制过度投资。文章为控股股东侵占行为提供了证据,同时表明股权分置改革有效缓解了过度投资。From the angle of investment behavior of listed companies, this paper investigates the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders and corporate governance, especially the positive effect of the split-share reform on restraining the overinvestment behavior of controlling sharehdders. Based on the expected investment model raised by Richardsonin in 2006, the results show that the divergence of control right and cash flow right has significantly positive effect on overinvestment, but the split-share reform can obviously weaken the positive relation between the divergence and overinvestment. Compared to private companies, the overinvestment in stateowned companies is more serious, and the improvement of external governance environment can restrain overinvestment to a certain extent. This paper provides evidence for the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders and the effectively positive effect of the split share reform on restraining overinvestment.

关 键 词：控股股东 过度投资 公司治理 股权分置改革 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]