贴牌生产与技术创新时代的战略联盟决策  

ODM and Strategic Alliance Decision in the Time of High-tech Innovation

作　　者：郭冰[1] 吕巍[1] 周颖[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2011年第20期4-9,共6页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家"985"二期工程哲学社会科学创新基地--上海交通大学中国都市圈发展与管理研究中心(RCMRC)基金

摘　　要：分析了在两个ODM制造商和两个销售商组成的双层市场结构中,ODM厂商选择自主研发或者与销售商结成纵向R&D联盟从事R&D活动的最优战略决策,探讨了知识溢出水平对ODM厂商R&D战略决策的影响,通过重复博弈分析给出了ODM厂商主导的纵向R&D联盟只进行一次R&D合作和进行无限次R&D合作的战略决策影响因素以及稳定性条件。研究结果发现,知识溢出效应的存在导致自主研发的投资成本上限下降,当R&D投资成本高于自主研发的投资成本上限而低于纵向R&D联盟的投资成本上限时,ODM厂商可以选择与销售商组成纵向R&D联盟,在增加联盟各方收益的同时,提高了社会总产量和整体福利水平;同时,有效的违约惩罚机制和适当的贴现因子可以保证纵向R&D联盟的稳定性。Considering a two-tier market structure that consists of two ODM manufacturers and two seller oligopolists,this paper analyzes how the ODM manufacturers make strategic decision between proceeding RD independence or proceeding RD by establishing vertical research joint ventures with sellers,discusses the influence of knowledge spillover on strategic decision making process,and analyzes the stability condition of vertical research joint ventures under circumstances of a one time RD cooperation or an infinitely repeated RD cooperation.This study shows that the existence of knowledge spillover decreases the upper bound of independent RD investment,so the ODM manufacturers can establish vertical research joint ventures with sellers,which can increase every member＇s profits in vertical RJV and improve total output and social welfare.Effective punishment mechanism can make ODM manufacturers abide by RJV contract.If the discount factor is high enough,infinitely repeated vertical RJV will maintain the stability.

关 键 词：ODM 知识溢出 R&D 纵向RJV 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]