股权制衡、法律保护与控股股东侵占——来自中国A股民营上市公司关联交易的实证分析  

Outside Block Holders, Legal Protection, and Expropriation of Controlling Shareholder: Evidence from RelatedParty Transactions of Listed Private Companies in the A-share Market

作　　者：周方召[1] 符建华[2] 尹龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨商业大学经济研究中心 [2]哈尔滨商业大学经济学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2011年第8期101-110,共10页Review of Investment Studies

摘　　要：控股股东利用关联交易对中小投资者利益进行侵占已经成为公司治理研究中最重要的问题。本文采用中国A股民营上市公司的相关数据,从关联交易规模的角度实证检验了股权制衡因素和外部投资者法律保护对于控股股东侵占的影响。研究结果发现,股权制衡程度越高,控股股东的侵占水平会越低;但是法律保护和股权制衡之间存在替代关系,两者对于控股股东侵占的作用具有一定的重合性,如果同步提高的话,可能会削弱股权制衡对于控股股东侵占的限制作用。Controlling shareholder＇s expropriation to minority shareholders by related-party transactions is a serious agency problem in corporate governance. This paper evaluate the effects of outside block holders and law protection using a firm-level dataset of China＇s private listed company in A-share stock market. We find that higher outside block holders ownership is associated with less expropriation. And there is a substitute relationship between the legal protection of the right of investors and outside block holders.

关 键 词：控股股东 股权制衡 法律保护 关联交易 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F276.5[经济管理—国民经济] F224