工业水环境监管契约研究  

RESEARCH ON INDUSTRIAL WATER ENVIRONMENT REGULATION CONTRACT

作　　者：赵爽[1,2] 王慧敏[1,2] 仇蕾[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学水文水资源与水利工程科学国家重点实验室,江苏南京210098 [2]河海大学管理科学研究所,江苏南京210098

出　　处：《长江流域资源与环境》2011年第10期1279-1284,共6页Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(08CJY022);国家社会科学基金重点项目(10AJY005);教育部科学技术研究重点项目(108064);江苏省"333工程"培养项目资助;中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2009B22214)

摘　　要：对工业污水排放的有效监管是水环境保护的重要环节。分析了我国目前监管主体所处的困境,考虑中央监察与公众参与的监督约束作用,构建了水环境监管体系。并设计出具有激励约束惩罚效力的水环境监管契约,建立委托-代理模型,通过求解得出监管契约中污水排放标准、监管频率、补偿额度以及罚款数额的最优值。在此基础上,以太湖流域两个成本类型差异较大的印染企业为例,定量设计两级水环境监管契约,分析公众参与程度和地方政府庇护企业程度对契约取值的影响。结果表明:提高公众参与程度可以有效降低罚款额度,削减政企矛盾;当公众参与程度和惩罚额度一定时,通过环境问责等制度降低地方政府庇护企业的程度,能够减小监管频率,从而削减监管执行成本。Industrial effluent effective regulation is an important part of environmental protection. By analyzing plights of the participants in water environmental regulation in China, a water environment regulation system was constructed considering the central monitoring and public participation. Moreover, a water en- vironment regulation contract, which has the effect of incentive and constraint penalty, was established, and a principal-agent model was also developed, by which a set of optimal results of effluent standards, regulation probability, compensation amount and fines in the water environment regulation contract. Based on this system, two printing and dyeing enterprises in Tai Lake, which have considerably different cost types and water treatments, were taken as examples. A two-stage contract has been designed for the two enterprises according to the results from the model, and the effects of public participation and local govern- ment protection probability on the contract are investigated. The results show that to enhance the public participation could decrease the optimal fine amount, which will weaken the contradictions between the lo- cal government and enterprise, and that by some system as environment accountability to decrease the local government protection probability will reduce the optimal regulatory frequency and make the supervision be low correspondingly.

关 键 词：委托-代理理论 工业水环境监管 两级契约 

分 类 号：X143[环境科学与工程—环境科学]