基于互惠视角的团队协作激励机制博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of the Incentive Mechanism for Team Cooperation——From Reciprocity Perspective

作　　者：钱峻峰[1,2] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆工商大学财政金融学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2011年第16期138-141,共4页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(07BJY017);重庆工商大学青年基金项目(2008005)

摘　　要：团队激励的关键问题是团队成员的合作问题。修正放松了关于团队成员的理性人假设,引入互惠性假设,用考虑互惠心理效用的效用函数替代物质效用函数,构建包括两个团队成员的团队协作生产的博弈模型。研究了两种博弈模型的团队成员最优自身努力水平和帮助他人的努力水平,并进行对比分析。结果表明,在同时考虑物质效用和互惠心理效用的情况下,非理性团队成员的行为更加复杂,他们会在物质收益和互惠收益之间寻求平衡。The cooperation of team members is the key in team incentive.This paper develops a model of cooperation of team with two members in which the hypothesis on rational team member is relaxed and reciprocity is incorporated,the utility function considering both material and reciprocity psychological utility takes the place of the traditional one.Team member＇s optimal degree of effort for himself and for the other are researched,the result shows that the behavior of irrational team members is more complex,they will keep balance between material and reciprocity payoffs.

关 键 词：团队协作 互惠 激励机制 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]