我国上市公司高管激励型薪酬模式研究  

Study on Incentive Pattern of Senior Executives' Compensation of Chinese listed Companies

作　　者：杨刚[1] 王磊[1] 由雯[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学管理学院,教授长春130022

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2011年第11期53-56,共4页Chinese Public Administration

摘　　要：对上市公司高管薪酬的调控与管理,最终目的是为了使高管薪酬的决策机制符合企业发展战略,使薪酬水平和薪酬结构能够更有效地吸引和激励高管人员。本文通过分析上市公司高管薪酬由董事会主观定价的制度性缺陷,提出了上市公司高管激励型薪酬模型,意在促使主观定价模式转变为客观定价模式。同时,对上市公司高管股权激励模式作了对比选择和适当改进,分析了EVA激励模式的缺陷和相应的修正激励模式以及上市公司高管薪酬的层级模式,提出了上市公司CEO与其他高管的薪酬差距有助于增强CEO的责任感、经营压力和管理权威。The ultimate aim to regulate and manage the listed companies＇ executive compensation is to make the executive compensation decision mechanism consistent with the enterprise＇s development strategy,so that the level of compensation and compensation structure can be more effective to attract and motivate executives.This paper puts forward incentive compensation model of listed company executives through the analysis of top executive compensation of listed company by the board of directors of subjective pricing system defect.It intends to make subjective pricing model into an objective pricing model.At the same time,the paper is trying to make contrast selection and proper modification to executives equity incentive mode of listed companies,and analysing the EVA defects incentive pattern and corresponding correction incentive mode and the hierarchy model of top executive compensation of listed company.The paper thinks that the pay gap between the CEO of listed company and other top executives（and not all executive pay gap） contributes to enhance the sense of responsibility,operating pressure and management authority of CEO of listed company.

关 键 词：上市公司 高管 激励型薪酬 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F276.6[经济管理—国民经济]