构建具有激励作用的独立董事薪酬机制研究  

Construction of Remuneration Mechanism with Stimulation Function for Independent Director

作　　者：张晓明[1] 李辽宁[1] 李辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710127

出　　处：《西安电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第5期28-31,共4页Journal of Xidian University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：陕西省教育厅科研计划项目(07JK122)

摘　　要：从法律法规风险、声誉风险、市场风险和经济风险四个方面分析了与构建独立董事薪酬机制紧密相关的独立董事执业风险。对浙江、陕西、青海三省2009年上市公司独立董事薪酬的相关数据做了统计,分析了我国独立董事薪酬的现状以及存在的问题。重构了由固定薪酬、延期支付薪酬、股票期权构成的具有激励作用的独立董事薪酬机制。This article firstly analyzes the practice risks of independent director from four aspects which are closely related to the remuneration mechanism for independent director. These four aspects are law risk, reputation risk, market risk and economical risk. Secondly, this article analyzes the current situation and problems of the remuneration for independent director based on the statistics of remuneration for independent director from listed companies＇ annual reports for 2009. These listed companies are respectively located in Zhejiang province, Shaanxi province and Qinghai province. Finally we reconstruct the remuneration mechanism for independent director with three parts including fixedly payed remuneration, delayedly payed remuneration and stock notion.

关 键 词：独立董事 薪酬机制 股票期权 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]