治理人监督与战略绩效信息偏误的情境依赖  

Dependence on institution condition between governor supervision and distorted information of strategic performance: Power development and punishment strength

作　　者：程新生[1,2] 李海萍[3] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心,天津300071 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [3]北京石油化工学院经济管理学院,北京102627

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2011年第10期1-10,共10页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072095;70771048);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71132001);国家社科重大资助项目(10ZD&035);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大资助项目(2009JJD630001)

摘　　要：将治理人、经理人以及制度环境多个要素纳入一个系统,以代理理论为基础,仿真模拟权力发展和惩罚力度两种环境因素对治理人监督与经理人操纵战略绩效信息行为间的交互过程的影响.研究发现,1)经理人处于权力累积阶段时,无论惩罚制度如何,治理人适合选择监督强度的小幅度变化,由此带来的战略绩效信息偏误程度最小;2)经理人处于权力稳定阶段时,如果惩罚力度较大,治理人适合选择监督强度的小幅度变化;而惩罚力度较小时,则适合选择监督强度的中等幅度变化;3)对权力累积阶段的经理人同时施以高水平的惩罚力度与大幅度的监督强度变化对经理人操纵战略绩效信息存在正向刺激作用,对于权力稳定阶段的经理人来说,则恰好相反.In this paper,governor and manager and institution condition are taken as a system,and based on agent theory,we simulate the influence of environmental factors,including the type of manager＇s power and punishment strength,on the relation between the rate of governor changing supervision level and distorted information of strategic performance.The results indicate that,（1） when the power is impermanent and contested to the manager,governors should slightly enhance supervision level regardless of the punishment strength,which leads to minimum level of distorted information of strategic performance.（2）When the power is institutionalized and perpetual,governors should slightly enhance supervision level in the background of severe punishment,and moderately change supervision level in the background of mild punishment.（3） When the increase in supervision level is drastic,the manager,whose power is impermanent and contested,could be prompted to manipulate strategic performance information.And it is reversed to manager in the institutionalization and perpetuation of power.

关 键 词：治理人监督 战略绩效信息偏误 权力发展 惩罚力度 多智能体仿真模型 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]