货币政策、信息披露质量与公司债务融资  

Monetary Policy,Information Disclosure Quality and Corporate Debt Financing

作　　者：李志军[1,2,3] 王善平[1,2,3] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学,410079 [2]湖南工业大学,412007 [3]湖南师范大学,410081

出　　处：《会计研究》2011年第10期56-62,97,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家社科基金08BJY025;教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-06-0703)的阶段性研究成果;湖南省"风险导向审计研究基地"的资助

摘　　要：信息透明度是影响企业债务融资成本的重要因素。本文以2002-2010年深圳A股公司为样本,研究发现:信息披露质量较好的公司在货币政策趋紧时获得了更多的银行借款,且随着融资需求的增大,获得的银行借款更多,银行借款的利率也更低。结果表明,较高的信息披露质量有助于降低银企间的信息不对称程度,增强企业获得银行贷款的资信度,降低企业的债务融资成本,从而减轻货币政策变动对企业债务融资带来的不利影响。The transparency of information is an important factor in bank borrowings. In this paper,using the Shenzhen A-share companies of 2002-2010 as samples,we found that the companies with a better quality of information disclosure received more bank loans when monetary policy was tightening. And with the increase of financing needs,they received more amount of bank loans with much lower interest rates. Higher quality of information disclosure helps reduce information asymmetries between banks and enterprises,enhance the creditworthiness of enterprises to obtain bank loans,reduce the cost of debt financing,thereby reducing the adverse effects of volatility of monetary policy on corporate debt financing.

关 键 词：信息披露质量 信息不对称 债务融资成本 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F822.0[经济管理—国民经济]