全流通环境下投资者利益保护研究——控股股东、中小股东和经理人三方博弈分析  

Study on Investor Protection under Full Circulation of Stocks:Analysis Based on Tripartite Game among Controlling Shareholders,Minority Shareholders and Managers

作　　者：徐慧玲[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]湖北经济学院金融学院,湖北武汉430205 [2]华中科技大学经济学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《财经研究》2011年第11期71-79,共9页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科研究青年项目(09YJC790075);湖北省教育厅科学技术研究青年项目(Q20102201)

摘　　要：随着上市公司控制权的转移,投资者保护在全流通环境下有了新的内涵。文章从公司的委托代理问题出发,构建了控股股东、中小股东和经理人的三方博弈模型。各方决策的混合策略纳什均衡结果显示,股权的集中在一定程度上可以抑制公司的"内部人控制";为保护投资者利益,应对控股股东和经理人的违规操作进行严厉惩罚,降低投资者的监督稽查成本,健全上市公司的治理机制。With the transfer of listed corporate control, investor protection under full circulation of stocks has a new meaning. This paper constructs a model concerning tripartite game among controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and managers from the angle of corporate principal-agent problem. The solution to mixed strategic Nash equilibrium indicates that equity concentration can help to inhibit corporate insider control to some extent; in order to protect the interests of investors, controlling shareholders and managers who implement illegal operations should be punished severely, and the investors＇ supervision cost should reduce; in addition, governance mechanisms of listed companies should be improved.

关 键 词：股权分置改革 投资者保护 委托代理 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]