委托代理理论下业主对施工承包商的激励设计  

Designing Owners' Incentive Given to Construction Contractors under Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：陆龚曙[1] 易涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学经济与管理学院,北京102206

出　　处：《系统工程》2011年第9期72-77,共6页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：在建筑工程领域,施工过程中的信息不对称使工程承包商为追求自身利益而与业主处于非合作的状态,而合理有效的激励机制能促使承包商与业主建立合作关系,共同促进项目的成功。利用委托-代理理论,在工程直接费与工期成非线性关系的前提下,把工程成本与工期同时作为激励因子,建立了业主对承包商在信息不对称情况下的激励模型,利用遗传算法通过算例对模型进行了求解,计算出了激励系数,最后通过多组数据的实验,得到了分别影响成本与工期激励系数的因素及其影响趋势,并通过与工程的实际情况对比有效地验证了所建模型的合理性。In the field of construction engineering,the asymmetry information during the construction process always results in contractors＇ non-cooperativeness with owners in pursuit of their self-interests,whereas a sound and effective incentive mechanism can encourage both owners and contractors to establish a reliable partnership and make joint efforts to make the project a success.Hence,on the premise of the nonlinear relationship between construction duration and its direct cost,this paper firstly builds an incentive model between owners and construction contractors under information asymmetry by applying principal-agent theory,in which construction duration and its cost are simultaneously selected as incentive factors.Then the model is solved with the aid of one example by utilizing the genetic algorithms,and the incentive coefficients are calculated.Finally,according to several sets of experimental data,the factors influencing incentive coefficients of cost and duration respectively and their influencing trend are concluded.The rationality of the proposed model is also well verified by comparing the actual situation of construction engineering.

关 键 词：成本和工期 非线性 委托-代理 激励 遗传算法 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]