联盟博弈下基于Shapley值法的三层供应链协调机制  

Coordination Mechanism about the Three-echelon Supply Chain Based on Shapley Value in Cooperative Games

作　　者：张成堂[1,2] 武东[1] 周永务[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]安徽农业大学应用数学研究所,合肥230036 [2]合肥工业大学数学学院,合肥230009 [3]华南理工大学工业工程系,广州510640

出　　处：《工程数学学报》2011年第6期763-770,共8页Chinese Journal of Engineering Mathematics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70771034;70971041);国家社会科学基金(11CGL029);安徽省高等学校自然科学基金(KJ2010B337);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(20060359007);安徽农业大学青年科学基金(2009zr26)~~

摘　　要：本文针对制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三层供应链系统,研究了价格敏感型需求下的联盟博弈和收益分配问题.理论分析表明独立决策下的的供应链系统利润最低,小联盟决策能提高系统利润,但是未入小联盟的成员收益涨幅则更为明显,智猪博弈的结果会致使小联盟解散,而运用Shapley值法协调后的大联盟相对更为稳定,其成员利润均比非合作决策时有大幅度的提高,有利于激励供应链成员保持长期充分的合作.最后,通过数值算例对上述结论作了进一步释义和分析.For the three-echelon supply chain system composed of manufacturers, distributors and retailers, this paper discusses the cooperative game and the profit allocation under the price-sensitive demand. It is shown that： the supply chain system by the independent decision-making has the least profit, and the system by the minor league decision-making can improve the system profit, but the profit of the members outside the minor league rises even more obviously, and the result of Pigs＇ payoffs would cause the dissolution of the minor league, while the major league coordinated by using the Shapley value method is relatively more stable, and its members＇ profit often increases and it is helpful to encourage the members to keep a long-term cooperation. Finally, the conclusions are further illustrated through numerical examples.

关 键 词：供应链 联盟博弈 SHAPLEY值 价格 收益分配 稳定性 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]