终极控制、国家控股与现金持有价值  

Ultimate Control,State Ownership and the Value of Cash Holdings

作　　者：吴德胜[1] 孙志东[2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心,天津300071 [2]中国工商银行总行资产管理部,北京100140

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2011年第11期80-86,共7页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70802049;70802050)

摘　　要：从中国上市公司国有控股的背景出发,研究了终极控制人类型、控制层级、股权结构与公司现金持有价值之间的关系。实证结果发现:机构投资者持股比例与现金持有价值无关,机构投资者并没有通过积极监督来提高上市公司的现金使用效率;控股股东持股比例与现金持有价值无关;国务院国资委控股上市公司(央企)现金持有的边际价值较高;央企上市公司的控制层级越长,代理问题和利益输送问题越严重,现金持有的边际价值越低。Based on the circumstances of China,this paper investigates how ultimate control,the layer of pyramidal structure and state ownership affect the marginal value of cash holdings of listed corporate in China.Empirical evidence shows that there is no association between institutional ownership and the value of cash holding,and therefore institutional shareholder cannot improve efficiency of cash use by monitoring;there is no association between ultimate shareholder ownership and the value of cash holding;the value of cash holdings of companies controlled by central government are higher than those of other types of companies;the longer the layer of pyramidal structure of companies controlled by central government,more severe the agency problem in central state-owned corporation is,and the less the value of their cash holdings are.

关 键 词：终极控制 国家控股 公司治理 控制层级 现金持有价值 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]