电信服务提供商的多因素激励机制研究  

The Study on the Multi-factors Incentive Mechanism for the Service Provider

作　　者：李雷[1] 鲁利民[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学高级工商管理教育中心,四川成都610075

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2011年第2期46-50,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70473006):电信管制经济学基础

摘　　要：在电信运营商和SP合作中,电信运营商提供业务传输通道,SP主要提供业务服务,然后二者按一定比例对该业务收益进行分成。如何处理电信运营商与SP的关系,是电信产业未来几年所要研究的重点,由于电信运营商和电信服务提供商(SP)之间存在利益冲突和信息不对称,很容易导致SP的违规行为。电信运营商和SP之间的关系属于多因素的委托-代理关系。在设计委托-代理激励合同时,从多因素角度考虑了电信运营商对SP的激励,在设计委托-代理激励合同时,从两个任务的角度即:可观测到的SP发展的用户数、业务量和用户数及业务量增量和可观测到的SP的信用积分和等级。并通过风险成本和代理成本研究可知对SP进行多因素激励是非常必要的。在具体分析时采用了双因素激励模型。In order to handle the increasing new services brought by the service convergence,the telecom operators must properly deal with the allocation of the enterprise resources and the relationship with the SP.There are much conflict and asymmetric information between the telecom operators and the service providers,and that easily results in the violations of the service provider.The relationship between the telecom operators and the service providers is multi-factors principal-agent.The design of the principal-agent contract considers two tasks perspectives on the incentive for the SP.The first is the observable number of subscribers developed by the SP,services,the number of subscribers,and the incremental services.The second is the observable credit marks and rank order.The multi-factors incentive for the service provider is considered in the design of the principal-agent incentive contract,and it is necessary for the service providers to have the multi-factor incentive through the risk costs and agential costs of the service providers is analyzed.The dual-factors incentive mechanism is used in actual analysis.

关 键 词：委托代理 非对称信息 激励机制 电信服务 风险成本 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]