融资结构对代理权争夺的影响及对策分析  

Influence of Financing Structure on Rivalry for Authority of Agency and Relevant Solutions

作　　者：张爱侠[1] Zhang Aixia(Hunan College of Information,Changsha,Hunan,410200)

机构地区：[1]湖南信息职业技术学院 湖南长沙410200

出　　处：《经济视角（下）》2008年第Z1期25-27,32,共4页Economic Vision

摘　　要： 代理权争夺的实质是现任管理者与持异议股东之间关于公司控制权的争夺,而融资结构将影响代理权争夺实现的难易程度。本文主要分析了融资结构对代理权争夺的影响,并提出从两个方面优化上市公司融资结构,包括赋予企业经理真正的经营权并给予相当的股权份额;深化商业银行的公司化改造,打造独立的债权主体。The nature of rivalry for authority of agency is rivalry for the business' control between the current administrator and the shareholders with disagreements.The financing structure will influence the occurrence of such rivalry.This article analyzes this influence and suggests that listed companies' financing structure should be optimized from two aspects: one is to confer real managerial authority on the manager and give him some shares;the other is to deepen the incorporation reform of commercial banks so as to have independent creditors.

关 键 词：代理权争夺 融资结构 影响 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理;经济管理—国民经济]