过度自信、风险厌恶与我国上市公司经理薪酬激励  

Overconfidence,Risk Aversion and Excutive Compensation

作　　者：周嘉南[1] 张希[1] 黄登仕[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都四川610031

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2011年第6期81-86,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目(70801051);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(08JC630068)

摘　　要：经理风险厌恶会增加股东使用业绩薪酬激励的成本,然而通过对我国上市公司高管的经验研究发现,如果经理过度自信,则会减弱风险厌恶带来的负面影响,表现为其薪酬中的报酬业绩敏感度更高,且其与风险之间的负相关关系减弱。同时研究还发现,非系统风险所占总风险比重较大的公司,相比系统风险所占比重较大的公司,会给予过度自信的高管更高的报酬业绩敏感度,这意味着高管的过度自信主要源于其对公司非系统风险认知的偏差。The risk aversion of the manager will increase the compensation cost based on performance. However, in this paper, by empirical study of data from Chinese listed firms, it is found that overconfidence will decrease the negative impacts of the risk aversion, which is acting as mangers with overconfidence are more sensitive to the compensation performance. It is also found that managers from the companies with higher proportion of unsystematic risks are more sensitive to the compensation performance than those from the companies with higher proportion of systematic risks, which means that the executive overconfidence mainly arises from the perception bias on the unsystematic risk of the firm.

关 键 词：过度自信 报酬业绩敏感度 非系统风险 

分 类 号：F244[经济管理—劳动经济]