不对称信息条件下投资者和会计师事务所的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of the Investors and Public Accounting Firm under the Asymmetric Informatioin

作　　者：韩丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]陕西师范大学国际商学院,陕西西安710062

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2011年第6期87-91,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：陕西师范大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(10SZYB26)

摘　　要：信息不对称条件下,会计师事务所和投资者分别有两种不同的战略选择。通过初步博弈分析发现低信任与低质量的相互促进构成了一种低效率陷阱,导致我国会计师事务所信誉缺失,重复博弈模型的构建进一步得出了摆脱低信誉的条件。加强的信誉,确保质询权,建立高报酬机制及加大违规处罚力度是保护投资者权益和建立会计师事务所信誉的有效途径。Under asymmetric information, public accounting firms and investors individually take two different strategic selections. The low trust and low quality lead to the low reputation of public accounting firms in China. After the repeated game model being built in the paper, the methods to get rid of low reputation has been found. Four efficient ways can used to protect investors and build the reputation of public accounting firms.- reinforce reputation, ensure enquiry right, set high reward mechanism and increase penalties.

关 键 词：信誉 重复 博弈 会计师事务所 投资者保护 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F239.2