基于委托—代理的品牌联盟风险规避机制研究  

Research on the Risk Avoiding Mechanism of Brand Alliance Based on Principal-Agent Theory

作　　者：陈东灵[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《广东商学院学报》2011年第6期63-72,共10页Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies

摘　　要：品牌联盟作为一种新的战略运营模式正被越来越多的企业接受,成为提升新品牌或不知名品牌资产的有效途径。为规避品牌联盟的风险,从委托—代理理论出发,一是应考虑可观测变量的激励合同,以剔除更多的外部环境影响,全方位观察考核修饰品牌;二是应考虑品牌声誉的激励合同,修饰品牌越注重声誉的提高,主导品牌的期望效用就越大;三是应构建内部监督机制,促使修饰品牌选择合作行为,同时应提高修饰品牌合作的正常收益、不合作被发现的概率、违约金数额,在保障其合作带来正常收益的同时,减少其不合作的额外收益与保留收益。As a new strategic operating model,brand alliance is being accepted by more and more companies and is becoming an effective way to enhance the brand equity of new or unknown brands.To avoid the risk of brand alliance,the paper,based on the principal-agent theory,suggests that firstly,the incentive contract which involves observable variables should be considered to remove the influence of more external environment and to comprehensively observe and assess decorated brand;secondly,the incentive contract which involves brand reputation should be considered because the more a decorated brand pays attention to improving reputation,the higher the expected utility of a leading brand would be;thirdly,an internal supervision mechanism should be built in order to urge the decorated brand to choose cooperative behaviors,and simultaneously,the normal earnings produced by decorated brand cooperation,the probability of found non-cooperation and the amount of penalty should be increased so as to reduce additional revenues of non-cooperation and retained earnings while guaranteeing normal earnings of cooperation.

关 键 词：品牌联盟 风险规避 委托—代理理论 主导品牌 修饰品牌 

分 类 号：F273.2[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]