制度效率、家族化途径与家族投资偏好  

Institutional Efficiency,Family-based Routes and Family Investment Preference

作　　者：陈德球[1] 钟昀珈[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际财务与会计研究中心,北京100029

出　　处：《财经研究》2011年第12期107-117,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71102076);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630019;10YJC630070);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(11YJA630085);对外经济贸易大学学术创新团队资助项目;211工程三期建设项目(7320032)的资助

摘　　要：文章以家族企业投资决策为研究对象,考察了转轨与新兴双重特征下家族控制影响企业投资决策的机理。研究发现,家族控制人的风险规避偏好在投资决策中占主导,家族企业的长期投资规模小于非家族企业,其偏好于实体资本投资而限制高风险的R&D投资活动;家族风险规避偏好的短期投资行为在通过并购重组实现家族控制和职业经理人担任CEO的家族企业中更为显著;较高的制度效率可以减少家族控制人的风险规避动机,促进企业投资活动增加。This paper studies the effect of family control on corporate investment decision-making under the background of transitional and emerging economy from the angle of investment decision-making of family firms.It finds that family controller＇s preference for risk aversion dominates in the investment decision-making,and the long-term investment scales of family firms,which prefer physical capital investment and restrict RD investment with high risk,are smaller than the ones of non-family firms;and the effect of family preference for risk aversion on the short-term investment behavior is more significant in family firms which are founded by mergers and acquisitions and whose CEOs are professional managers;high institutional efficiency can reduce family controller＇s motive for risk aversion and promote corporate investment.

关 键 词：制度效率 家族偏好 资本支出 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]