经理人组合报酬激励契约模型研究  

Research on the Incentive Contract Model of Manager's Combined Rewards

作　　者：肖嫣[1] 张国民[1] 陈进[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《企业活力》2011年第12期45-49,共5页Enterprise Vitality

基　　金：教育部人文科学项目"基于期权角度的高管团队定价模型研究"(编号:07JA630070);上海市研究生创新基金项目"基于人力资本理论的国企高管激励的系统性全新研究"(编号:JWCXSL1022);上海理工大学人文社科基金"企业激励新视角:人力资本外部性内在化的产权制度安排"(编号:1F10303006)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：经理人报酬激励制度是现代企业激励机制的重要组成部分,现代经理人的报酬激励具有多种实现形式。为了激励经理人的有效行为,利用最优报酬契约经济理论构建了一个包含短期激励以及长期激励的财务性组合报酬契约模型,以及分析非财务性报酬对经理人行为选择的影响,是十分必要的,尤其是对我国国有企业经理人报酬激励制度优化问题,应该是很好的借鉴。The rewards incentive mechanisms of managers play an important part in the modern enterprise incentive system.It is essential to do some discussion on modern managers＇ rewards incentive system and its realizing forms,and construct a contract model of managers＇ financial combined compensation which contains short-term incentives and long-term incentives based on the economic theory of the optimal compensation contract,and analyse the effects of non-financial rewards to managers.That should be a good reference,especially to managers incentive compensation system optimization problems in state-owned enterprises in our country.

关 键 词：激励制度 信息不对称 组合报酬契约 股票期权 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]