高管薪酬、风险承担与银行绩效:中国的经验证据  

Executive Compensation,Risk-taking and Perfor-mance: Evidence from China

作　　者：宋清华[1] 曲良波[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学金融学院

出　　处：《国际金融研究》2011年第12期69-79,共11页Studies of International Finance

基　　金：新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助(NCET-10-0778)

摘　　要：本文选择2000-2010年中国13家商业银行的非平衡面板数据．对我国商业银行高管薪酬、风险承担与银行绩效的关系进行了实证研究。结果表明，我国商业银行高管薪酬与风险承担呈倒u形关系，高管薪酬与银行绩效呈正向关系，高管薪酬激励在提升了银行绩效的同时也加大了银行风险。我们建议，高管薪酬制度设计要充分考虑风险因素，充分发挥董事会及其薪酬委员会在薪酬管理中的作用，增强高管薪酬的透明性，加强对高管薪酬的监管。Based on unbalanced data of 13 commercial banks in china from the year 2000 to 2010, we conduct an empirical study among the relationship of executive compensation, corporate governance and risk-taking of commercial banks in china in this paper. In the results, it reveals a reverse U-shape relation between executive compensation of commercial banks in China and risk-taking and positive relation between executive compensation and bank performance; the incentive of executive compensation promotes bank performance and enhances bank risk-taking at the same time. According to the results, it is recommend that risk factors should be fully considered in setting up the compensation system of executives, and board directors and their committee should play a full role in compensation management. Moreover the transparency of executive compensation should be enhanced, and the regulation of executive compensation should be strengthened.

关 键 词：商业银行 高管薪酬 风险承担 银行绩效 

分 类 号：F831[经济管理—金融学]